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TARASOFF AT THIRTY: VICTIM'S
KNOWLEDGE SHRINKS THE
PSYCHOTHERAPIST'S DUTY TO WARN AND
PROTECT
Brian Ginsberg'
INTRODUCTION
In 1974, the California Supreme Court made headlines in medical
privacy law when it held in Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of
California2 that a psychotherapist has a duty to warn a third party, and
therefore breach patient confidentiality, if one of his patients makes a
sufficiently strong and serious threat towards the third party. In a very
rare occurrence, the court reheard the case two years later and
extended this duty from warning to full-fledged protection.' This
quickly polarized the medical community, as well as a sizeable number
of legal commentators, against the judiciary. Many psychotherapists
lashed out at the California opinions, arguing that they constituted a
large step backward in the evolution of the therapist-patient privilege.
1. The author's primary research interests include health law generally, and
medico-legal ethics in particular, with a focus on privacy issues. He thanks Susan
E. Lederer, Associate Professor of History of Medicine at Yale University, for
several productive discussions of the history of medical privacy that partly inspired
this paper. The author earned both a B.S., cum laude, with departmental
distinction in Mathematics, and an M.S. in Mathematics from Yale University in
2004. All correspondence should be sent to bginsb@law.columbia.edu.
2. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 529 P.2d 553, 555 (Cal. 1974),
reh'g granted, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
3. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 340 (Cal. 1976).
4. See Alan A. Stone, The Tarasoff Decisions: Suing Psychotherapists to
Safeguard Society, 90 HARV. L. REV. 358, 378 (1976). Stone tempered his
statements eight years later in ALAN A. STONE, LAW, PSYCHIATRY, AND
MORALITY 181 (Am. Psychiatric Press, Inc. 1984), when he wrote that the "duty to
warn is not as unmitigated a disaster for the enterprise of psychotherapy as it once
seemed to critics like myself."
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But, three decades later, it appears that these controversial decisions
might hold more potential for good than once was believed.
In particular, a recent but persistent line of cases has limited the so-
called "Tarasoff duty" when the victim had prior knowledge of the
patient-attacker's violent tendencies.5 This has quelled some of the
controversy stemming from the sweeping breadth of the original 1974
and 1976 decisions. This limitation has also appeased those therapists
who viewed the courts as shifting the public protection burden from
the realm of law enforcement to the realm of psychotherapy.
Also, psychotherapists have re-examined Tarasoff for themselves, to
very interesting ends. To wit, some contemporary psychiatric
commentators have presented anecdotal evidence suggesting that the
act of issuing a "Tarasoff warning" might be a valuable clinical tool,
particularly when done by the patient himself.
6
In short, thirty years of reflection and empirical observation have
cast Tarasoff in a more optimistic, evolving light.
5. See discussion infra Part VII.
6. Damon Muir Walcott et al., Current Analysis of the Tarasoff Duty: An
Evolution Towards the Limitation of the Duty to Protect, 19 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 325,
340 (2001).
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I. TARASOFF V. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA:
7
FACTS AND BACKGROUND
In 1969, two hundred fifty thousand Americans marched on the
Capitol to protest United States involvement in the Vietnam War.
8
Droves of rock-and-roll fans flocked to a pasture in Sullivan County,
New York, for the first Woodstock Music Festival.
9 Dr. Lawrence
Moore, a clinical psychologist at the University of California at
Berkeley student health center, began treating a graduate student from
India named Prosenjit Poddar. Several weeks into treatment, Dr.
Moore diagnosed Poddar as a potentially dangerous paranoid
schizophrenic. The chief basis for his diagnosis was Poddar's
pathological attachment to Tatiana Tarasoff.
1
'
Poddar first met Tarasoff a year earlier in a folk dancing class at the
university's International House. They became good friends and, on
New Year's Eve of 1968, Tarasoff kissed Poddar. Poddar interpreted
the kiss as an indication of a serious relationship, yet Tarasoff rebuffed
all of Poddar's subsequent romantic attempts. Poddar grew
increasingly distressed with each rejection and sought emotional
counseling, eventually ending up in the care of Dr. Moore.
1
7. This general heading actually refers to a trio of cases (all of which have the
same set of facts): Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 108 Cal. Rptr. 878 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1973); Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 529 P.2d 553 (Cal. 1974);
and Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). The 1976
decision is a rehearing of the 1974 case, and interestingly it makes no mention of
why the California Supreme Court decided to permit such a rare occurrence. The
1974 and 1976 California Supreme Court decisions are often called Tarasoff I and
Tarasoff H, respectively, and I will preserve this convention.
The Tarasoff fact pattern is nearly identical to the fact pattern in two
criminal cases involving Poddar: People v. Poddar, 103 Cal. Rptr. 84 (Cal. Ct. App.
1972), and People v. Poddar, 518 P.2d 342 (Cal. 1974). I shall call these cases
Poddar I and Poddar H, respectively. Poddar II reversed Poddar I (which itself
brought Poddar's conviction down from murder in the second degree to
manslaughter), as the supreme court concluded that the appeals court issued poor
jury instructions regarding the consideration of Poddar's mental illness. The court
uses more vivid detail in the Poddar cases than in the Tarasoff cases, so I will
sometimes reference Poddar rather than Tarasoff for background information.
8. John Herbers, 250,000 War Protesters Stage Peaceful Rally in Washington;
Militants Stir Clashes Later, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1969, at 1.
9. Michael T. Kaufman, Generation Gap Bridged as Monticello Residents Aid
Courteous Festival Patrons, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1969, at 25.
10. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 108 Cal. Rptr. 878, 880 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1973).
11. Poddar H, 518 P.2d 342, 344 (Cal. 1974).
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During the ninth therapy session, Poddar confided in Dr. Moore that
he was going to kill an unnamed female, readily identifiable as
Tarasoff, when she returned from a vacation in Brazil. Dr. Moore
notified the campus police and told them that he thought Poddar
should be civilly committed. The police took Poddar into custody but
released him shortly after judging him to be rational and not harmful.
They also made Poddar promise to stay away from Tarasoff."2
In the meantime, Dr. Moore's request for civil commitment was
denied. 3 Poddar was never restrained further, and he never returned
to therapy. On October 27, 1969, Poddar entered Tarasoff's home and
chased her into the backyard, where he shot her with a pellet gun and
fatally stabbed her with a kitchen knife. Immediately, Poddar
reentered the house and called the police. He told them he had
stabbed Tarasoff and wished to be handcuffed.1 4
Though convicted of second-degree murder, Poddar had his
conviction reduced to manslaughter in 1972 when the California Court
of Appeals determined that the trial judge failed to issue a proper jury
instruction regarding Poddar's mental condition.' 5  In 1974, the
California Supreme Court reversed the appeals court decision--on the
theory that, given Poddar's mental condition, even a manslaughter
charge might be unduly harsh--and remanded Poddar for a new trial.1 6
Several years passed, though, and rather than begin a lengthy retrial,
the state deported Poddar to India and barred him from ever returning
to the United States.
17
Vitaly and Lydia Tarasoff, Tatiana's parents, brought suit against the
University of California, the therapists who treated Poddar at the
student health center, and the police. 8  The Tarasoffs argued the
therapists and police acted negligently in failing to secure Poddar's
commitment. The Tarasoffs said these failed attempts to commit
Poddar deterred him from returning to therapy and indirectly made his
attack on Tatiana possible. In a 5-2 decision (known as Tarasoff I), the
California Supreme Court found that both the police and
12. TarasoffI1, 551 P.2d 334, 341 (Cal. 1976).
13. Id.
14. Poddar II, 518 P.2d at 345.
15. Poddar I, 103 Cal. Rptr. 84 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972).
16. Poddar II, 518 P.2d 342.
17. Vanessa Merton, Confidentiality and the "Dangerous" Patient: Implications
of Tarasoff for Psychiatrists and Lawyers, 31 EMORY L.J. 263, 290 (1982). In the
same paper, Merton interestingly reports that Poddar (at the time of that article's
publication) was happily married to a lawyer. Id.
18. Tarasoff 1, 529 P.2d 553 (Cal. 1974).
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psychotherapists had an affirmative duty to warn Tarasoff of the threat
Poddar posed.' 9 However, a dissenting opinion urged that the court
not incite violations of the psychotherapist-patient privilege by
requiring disclosure of facts learned in the course of therapy.
20
Not surprisingly, a large portion of the psychotherapeutic
community disagreed with the court's ruling. The American
Psychiatric Association, for example, filed an amicus brief emphasizing
the sanctity of psychotherapist-patient confidentiality.2' Surprisingly,
the court agreed to rehear the case.22 This time the court released the
police from all liability but extended the scope of the psychotherapists'
liability.23 According to the second decision (known as Tarasoff II),
therapists must exercise "that reasonable degree of skill, knowledge,
and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of that
professional specialty under similar circumstances" to predict violence
in patients.24 Moreover, once a therapist predicts violence, he is legally
obligated not only to warn but to protect an identifiable potential
victim. 25 Justice Tobriner, who wrote the majority opinion in both
cases, concluded with a far-reaching and ominous declaration of when
a psychotherapist must breach confidentiality: "The protective
privilege ends where the public peril begins. 26
Outside criticism came immediately and often tendentiously, but,
from a psychotherapeutic point of view, was it warranted? The
hardships Tarasoff theoretically could have forced on therapists were
many, but did the subsequent case law really validate practitioners'
greatest fears? Also, aside from possible harm created, was any good
generated by these controversial opinions?
Thirty years after the first California Supreme Court Tarasoff
opinion, it is appropriate to take stock of these questions by charting
the evolution of Tarasoff through three decades of jurisprudence,
trying to determine how it has changed psychotherapy and how it can
19. Id. at 561.
20. Id. at 565 (Clark, J., dissenting). In Tarasoff H, Justice Mosk switched
from the majority to the dissent and wrote a separate opinion, dissenting in part
and concurring in part.
21. Brief of Amicus Curiae Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, Tarasoff I (Cal. 1974) (S.F.
No. 23042).
22. Tarasoff 11, 551 P.2d 334. The court gave no indication in the record as to
why it reheard Tarasoff 1.
23. Id. at 349.
24. Id. at 345 (quoting Bardessono v. Michels, 478 P.2d 480, 484 (Cal. 1970)).
25. Id. at 340.
26. Id. at 347.
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still change psychotherapy. To do this in context, one has first to look
at the very beginnings of the profession that Tarasoff influenced.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF AMERICAN PSYCHOTHERAPY
Arguably, American psychotherapy began in the early 1800s with
Benjamin Rush, the "first American psychiatrist." 27 Recognizing that
the brain is the "seat of the mind," Rush believed that
psychopathology stemmed from abnormalities of the cerebral blood
vessels. Accordingly, many of the early modes of therapy--swinging a
patient, bound by chains, from the ceiling of a room; total
immobilization via a confining "tranquilizer chair"; and sudden
submersion in water--are not what a contemporary therapist would call
"psychoanalytic. "28
The year 1844 saw the publication of the American Journal of
Insanity (which later became the American Journal of Psychiatry), the
first journal devoted to "diseases of the mind. 29 One of the articles in
the very first issue stressed the link between insanity and genius,
claiming to chronicle the madness of such celebrated authors as
30Alexander Pope and Lord Byron. In fact, it was not until later in the
nineteenth century that Sigmund Freud proposed the first well-formed
theory explaining mental illness in terms of life experiences as opposed
to purely physical imbalances or other spuriously related factors.3'
Freud matured professionally in an era of great progress in the natural
sciences, and he made sure that his theory of mental abnormality was
no less precise and systematic than contemporary theory in other,
more physical branches of medicine. 2
In 1895, Freud introduced the technique of free association, which
involved asking a patient to abandon conscious control over his ideas
27. FRANZ G. ALEXANDER & SHELDON T. SELESNICK, THE HISTORY OF
PSYCHIATRY: AN EVALUATION OF PSYCHIATRIC THOUGHT AND PRACTICE FROM
PREHISTORIC TIMES TO THE PRESENT 120 (Harper & Row 1966). Rush was the
only physician who signed the Declaration of Independence.
28. MICHAEL H. STONE, HEALING THE MIND: A HISTORY OF PSYCHIATRY
FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE PRESENT 121 (1997). The tranquilizer chair, designed by
Rush himself, was called "the most complete restraint of a patient ever devised."
Id.
29. Id. at 122.
30. Id. An excerpt from this article reads "Insanity is a disease particularly
incident to persons remarkable for their talent or genius." Id.
31. ALEXANDER & SELESNICK, supra note 27, at 183.
32. Id.
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and say whatever came into his head.33 Freud discovered that, when
performed over a sufficiently long period of time, free association
would lead the patient back to forgotten events and the emotions felt
when these events originally occurred. The cornerstone of this therapy,
termed "psychoanalysis," has always been confidentiality. 34 For any
patient, speaking freely is difficult. The necessary factor in overcoming
the natural resistance to complete candidness is the belief that
anything said in therapy will be kept in the confidence of the
therapist." According to Freud, "The whole undertaking becomes lost
labor if a single concession is made to secrecy.
3 6
Innovative as Freud was, he was not the first to propose
confidentiality in medical communication. The great healer
Hippocrates of Cos wrote in his eponymous oath: "All that may come
to my knowledge in the exercise of my profession or outside of my
profession or in daily commerce with men, which ought not to be
spread abroad, I will keep secret and will never reveal.,
37
This portion of the oath is an early recognition that safeguarding
patient secrets is absolutely necessary for treatment. Thomas Percival
of Britain drew on this fundamental tenet when composing his Medical
Ethics.38 The first Code of Medical Ethics of the American Medical
Association, drafted in 1847, borrowed extensively from Percival (and
therefore from Hippocrates) and championed physician-patient
confidence except in certain extenuating circumstances.39 Although
not officially stated, the general consensus among psychotherapists at
33. Id. at 194.
34. Id.
35. KARL A. MENNINGER, A MANUAL FOR PSYCHIATRIC CASE STUDY 5 (2d ed.
1962). Interestingly, Menninger was one of the first psychiatrists to go on record
saying that the psychotherapist-patient privilege should not be absolute. Id. at 39.
36. RALPH SLOVENKO, PSYCHOTHERAPY, CONFIDENTIALITY, AND PRIVILEGED
COMMUNICATION 41 (1966). Freud's daughter, Anna, a prolific analyst in her own
right, wrote that "[C]onfidentiality of the material ... is a prerequisite for free
association. No analysand succeeds in divesting himself of all defenses or controls
unless he can be certain that the derivatives of his id will not become known
beyond the confines of the analytic situation." 4 ANNA FREUD, THE WRITINGS OF
ANNA FREUD 417 (1968).
37. This excerpt appears in the Oath's English translation found in STEDMAN'S
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 799 (26th ed. 1995).
38. THOMAS PERCIVAL, MEDICAL ETHICS (Chauncey D. Leake ed., Robert E.
Krieger Publ'g 1975) (1803)
39. LILIAN R. FURST, MEDICAL PROGRESS AND SOCIAL REALITY: A READER
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY MEDICINE AND LITERATURE 32-36 (State Univ. of N.Y.
Press 2000).
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the time--then separate from so--called "medical men"--was to
incorporate confidentiality into their practices.4 1 These codes,
however, were merely professional guidelines and established no legal
relationship, or privilege, when applied to the communications
between psychotherapist and patient.
In fact, there was no legal protection for the communications
between regular physicians and patients in America until 1828, when
the state of New York enacted a statutory privilege.4' Confidentiality
became a widely discussed topic, and by 1966 two-thirds of the states
had laws establishing some sort of a physician-patient privilege.42 In
most of these statutes, though, special attention was not paid to
psychiatrist-patient communication.43 It was not until the early 1950s
that the courts began to recognize the difference between the role of
confidentiality for the ordinary physician and for the psychiatrist,
paving the way for accommodating the needs of psychotherapists
without medical degrees as well.44
III. ORIGINS OF A LEGAL PRIVILEGE FOR PATIENTS OF
PSYCHOTHERAPY
In the landmark 1952 Illinois trial court case of Binder v. Ruvell,
psychiatrist Dr. Roy Grinker refused to testify when the court sought
information about one of his patients. 4' Though Illinois had nophysician-patient privilege, the court ruled that the information given
by a patient to a psychiatrist in the course of psychotherapy was
protected from disclosure. It also commented on the special nature of
the psychiatrist-patient relationship:
It doesn't require any scientific knowledge to understand that
there can be no success in the effort to ascertain the true cause of
40. Ellen W. Grabois, The Liability for Psychotherapists for Breach of
Confidentiality, 12 J.L. & HEALTH 39, 40 (1997). This article observed that
psychotherapists have focused on confidentiality not only since 1847, but from the
"earliest beginnings" of the discipline. Id.
41. SLOVENKO, supra note 36, at 15. This privilege was created largely for
public health concerns. During this time, many people wanted to conceal
embarrassing venereal diseases and feared seeking treatment for them. A legal
privilege assured that any diagnosis would remain secret. Id.
42. Id. at 93.
43. Id.
44. Binder v. Ruvell, No. 52-C-2535 (Cir. Ct., Cook Cty., Ill. June 24, 1952),
reported in 150 JAMA 1241 (1952).
45. Id.
[Vol. 21:1
Tarasoff at Thirty
the disturbance or in determining the kind of treatment that
should be applied unless there is complete confidence in the
mind of the patient, not alone in the capacity and skill of the
psychiatrist but in the secrecy of the things transpiring in the
doctor's chambers. That relationship in that respect is unique
and is not at all similar to the relationship between [ordinary]
physician and patient.46
One test the court used in determining whether a privilege is
warranted is the application of the so-called Wigmore criteria: a four-
factor checklist created by former Northwestern University Law
School Dean John Wigmore outlining necessary (but not sufficient)
conditions for the existence of a privilege.47 The court gave the most
weight to the fourth factor--a cost-benefit analysis-and determined
that the harm caused by compelling Dr. Grinker to disclose the content
of his therapy sessions would outweigh the benefits to the present legal
case and to society generally.48 The Binder ruling marked the
beginning of courts' tendency to distinguish psychiatrists from other
physicians and give increased credence to all psychotherapists. In
1960, the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry issued a report
addressing the special need for psychiatric privilege.49 This report was
so influential that by 1987 forty-nine states had enacted privileges
46. Id. at 1242.
47. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2285
at 527, revised by John T. McNaughton (1961). Wigmore suggested that a legal
privilege should exist with respect to a communication only if: 1) The
communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed; 2)
This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relation between the parties; 3) The relation must be one
which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously (painstakingly)
fostered; and 4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct
disposal of litigation. Id.
Wigmore himself argued that the four-factor test works against the
establishment of any physician-patient privilege. He wrote that only husband-wife,
priest-penitent, and attorney-client privileges conform to all four factors. Id. at
528.
48. Binder v. Ruvell, No. 52-C-2535 (Cir. Ct., Cook Cty., Ill. June 24, 1952),
reported in 150 JAMA 1241, 1242 (1952). Judge Fisher wrote that the question of
whether it is more desirable to breach or preserve confidentiality "almost answers
itself in a case such as this." Id.
49. COMMITTEE ON PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW, GROUP FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, REPORT No. 45: CONFIDENTIALITY AND
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION IN THE PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY (1960).
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specifically for psychiatrists or other psychotherapists." By 1996, all
fifty states and the District of Columbia had some type of statutory
psychotherapist-patient privilege.5
None of these statutory privileges, however, are absolute. In every
case, extenuating circumstances can arise where a psychotherapist can
violate the privilege and not be held liable to the patient for doing so.52
One such circumstance occurs when a patient threatens violence
against an identifiable victim. Tarasoff goes a step further. The case
upends the concept of privilege by making the psychotherapist liable to
51the third party if harm does occur.
Examining Tarasoff s impact on psychotherapy requires a
multifaceted analysis. First, I will investigate how the decisions
changed the nature of the psychotherapist-patient relationship.
Second, I will explain how Tarasoff changed the attitudes of
prospective patients and their psychotherapists and how these shifts in
attitude affected the population of third parties (the general public).
Third, prior to examining trends in the resultant case law and in
medical attitudes, I will explore the medical problem of predicting
violence and the reasonableness of the standard to which Tarasoff
holds the psychotherapist.
50. RALPH SLOVENKO, PSYCHOTHERAPY AND CONFIDENTIALITY:
TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION, BREACH OF CONFIDENTIALITY, AND
REPORTING DUTIES 559-564 (Charles C. Thomas 1998). At this time, Alaska was
the only state without such a statutory privilege, although it did recognize such a
privilege at state common law.
51. Jaffee v. Redmond 51 F.3d 1346, 1356 (7th Cir. 1995). This case and its
affirmation by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1996 were chiefly responsible for
establishing a federal psychotherapist-patient privilege. Jaffee v. Redmond, 519
U.S. 1 (1996). The Court used the fact that all fifty states had such a privilege to
guide its reasoning. Id. at 12.
52. Some examples of exceptions to the privilege include: CONN. GEN. STAT. §
52-146c(b)(3) (2003), when the psychologist believes there is "risk of imminent
personal injury ... or risk of imminent injury to . . . property" of the patient or
others; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 740, para. 110/11(vi) (2004), when the patient makes a
"specific threat of violence" against an individual; and W. VA. CODE § 27-3-1(b)(4)
(2003), "to protect against a clear and substantial danger of imminent injury by a
patient or client to himself or another."
53. Tarasoff H, 551 P.2d 334, 343 (Cal. 1976).
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IV. TARASOFF'S IMPACT ON THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT
RELATIONSHIP
Before Tarasoff, the psychotherapist-patient relationship was largely
defined in pragmatic rather than legal terms. Benjamin Rush's
contemporaries certainly had no legal precedent to establish the
confidentiality central to their practice; they did so because they
realized that confidentiality in such a relationship is necessary for
proper treatment. More so than in the ordinary physician-patient
relationship, confidentiality in the psychotherapist-patient relationship
has been the profession's hallmark since the late nineteenth century.54
One way in which Tarasoff changed this special relationship was by
altering the content and direction of a psychotherapy session. Before
Tarasoff, the standard therapy session was largely patient-driven in
accordance with Freud's view that the person most qualified to extract
information from the patient is the patient himself.5 For this reason,
pre-Tarasoff psychiatric manuals advise new psychotherapists to say
nothing and listen as long as the patient is talking. He is rarely, if ever,
to be interrupted." This lets treatment evolve naturally, as the patient
controls nearly the entire content of each session.
The Tarasoff decisions, however, add an implicit structure to each
session. Since a therapist under Tarasoff can be held liable if he fails
to accurately predict violence, in many cases he needs to alter his
therapy to focus on the patient's violent thoughts and tendencies.
According to a survey conducted in 1977 shortly after Tarasoff II, and
reported in the Stanford Law Review (hereinafter "Stanford Survey"),
about twenty-seven percent of responding therapists reported directing
57
therapy sessions more toward the subject of dangerousness . A survey
conducted in 1987 and published in the Pacific Law Journal
(hereinafter "Pacific Survey"), reported that thirty-seven percent of
responding therapists said Tarasoff had caused them to devote
disproportionately more time focusing on the potential dangerousness
54. Jerome S. Beigler, Tarasoff v. Confidentiality, 2 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 273, 273
(1984) ("As asepsis is to surgery, so is confidentiality to psychiatry.").
55. Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria, in 7 THE STANDARD
EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 12
(James Strachey trans., Hogarth Press 1953). Freud did not start out with this
belief, but he quickly espoused it and "let the patient himself choose the subject of
the day's work...." Id.
56. MENNINGER, supra note 35, at 23.
57. Toni Pryor Wise, Where the Public Peril Begins: A Survey of
Psychotherapists to Determine the Effects of Tarasoff, 31 STAN. L. REV. 165, 180-81
n.82 (1978). The actual statistic is 26.8%.
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of their patients. 8 These increasingly significant minorities indicate
therapy sessions immediately after and up to ten years after Tarasoff
were less patient-driven than were pre-Tarasoff sessions. The
literature bears no large-scale Tarasoff-related survey of
psychotherapists after the Pacific Survey, but society's tendency to
grow more and more litigious with time suggests that the current value
of the aforementioned statistic relating to steering the therapy session
towards issues of dangerousness might represent an even larger
minority or perhaps the majority of psychotherapists today.
A decision such as Tarasoff reinforces to patients as well as
psychotherapists that what patients say during therapy may not remain
confidential. Since speaking openly with the psychotherapist is
absolutely necessary for any hope of successful treatment, any
reluctance on the part of the patient to do so would certainly lessen the
value of psychotherapy.59 The Stanford Survey reported that twenty-
five percent of responding therapists noticed patients' increased
reluctance to discuss violent thoughts once the patients knew that
there were some cases where the psychotherapist-patient confidence
could be broken. 60 The importance of violent thoughts to patient
treatment, however, has not changed. They are still considered part of
the group of primal urges from which a psychotherapist can uncover
the most information about his patients. Unfortunately, a significant
reported effect of Tarasoff has been the increased restriction on
tapping this reservoir of information.
Conversely, a consequence of similar magnitude arises when
therapists to spend too little time asking questions regarding
dangerousness in hopes of not discovering threatening information and
therefore avoiding a Tarasoff-like legal quandary. The Stanford
Survey indicates that a significant minority of responding therapists
were reluctant to probe deeply into their patients' lives because of the
potential for violence they might discover. Similarly, it reports that
most responding therapists felt more anxious (post-Tarasoff) when the
topic of violence arose during a session.6' Taken together, these
58. D.L. Rosenhan et al., Warning Third Parties: The Ripple Effects of
Tarasoff, 24 PAC. L.J. 1165, 1210 (1993).
59. BENJAMIN J. SADOCK & VIRGINIA A. SADOCK, 1 KAPLAN & SADOCK'S
COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 470 (6th ed., Williams & Wilkins
1995).
60. Wise, supra note 57, at 177 n.67. The actual figure is 24.5%.
61. Id. at 181 n.86. The Stanford Survey reported that 54% of respondent
therapists believed Tarasoff "increased [their] anxiety as an issue relating to
dangerousness is broached in the clinical setting." Id.
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tendencies to focus too much and too little on violence reinforce the
disproportionality that became part of psychotherapy after Tarasoff.
But what about potential patients not yet in therapy? Surely, if they
have the potential for violence, they pose a greater or equal danger to
society than those currently seeing a psychotherapist. How does
Tarasoff affect their willingness to seek therapy? On a related note,
how does Tarasoff affect psychotherapists' decisions to accept or reject
new patients?
V. PROSPECTIVE PATIENTS AND THEIR WOULD-BE THERAPISTS
To be sure, the prospective psychotherapy patient is often a delicate
individual. He is afflicted not with physical diseases for which there
are formulaic cures, but with maladies of the mind that sometimes
manifest themselves in less-than-obvious ways. The only route to
successful treatment is to find a therapist with whom he can speak
openly and candidly.62 But the content of the therapeutic dialogue is
not the only concern of the prospective patient; the mere act of seeking
therapy has always carried a social stigma.63 The patient would
therefore be hesitant to reveal that he is in therapy, much less the
actual thoughts and urges he discusses with his therapist.64 Although
there are no empirical studies of prospective patients' willingness to
seek therapy pre- and post-Tarasoff,65 it can be logically argued that
patients might be less willing to seek treatment if they know that any
desire the therapist perceives as significant and violent must be
communicated to a potential third party victim. If it persists, this
situation will have a perilous effect on both the prospective patient and
the public: the prospective patient will seek treatment less frequently,
reducing the likelihood that his harmful tendencies will remain safely
in check.
62. MENNINGER, supra note 35, at 5.
63. Arnold A. Hutschnecker, The Stigma of Seeing a Psychiatrist, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 20, 1973, at 39.
64. MENNINGER, supra note 35, at 4.
65. But there does exist an excellent survey of Texas patients, in particular,
that examines their perceptions of the psychotherapist-patient relationship before
and after 1979, the year Texas statutorily recognized psychotherapist-patient
privilege. The results, along with results relating to psychotherapist and health
care provider surveys, are reported in Daniel W. Shuman & Myron S. Weiner, The
Privilege Study: An Empirical Examination of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege,
60 N.C. L. REV 893 (1982).
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The issue of increased legal liability will consequently make the
psychotherapist more discerning in his patient selection. 66 This is
counterproductive to the aims of psychiatry--to treat and cure as many
individuals as possible and to benefit the greatest number of patients.
In fact, the Pacific Survey reported that forty-six percent of responding
psychotherapists have in one way or another avoided treating
potentially dangerous patients.6' Frightened by the possibility of
learning dangerous desires and the problem of figuring out how to
protect the third party, the post-Tarasoff psychotherapist might
actually systematically discard those patients in greatest need of
psychotherapy. Compounding the problem of a prospective patient's
reluctance to seek treatment, selective treatment by the
psychotherapist will endanger both the public and the violent
individual in desperate need of counseling.
68
What exactly constitutes a violent individual? How does a therapist
determine if a patient is violent and, further, how does a therapist
determine if a patient intends to harm an identifiable third party?
VI. PREDICTING DANGEROUSNESS: WHERE PSYCHOTHERAPISTS
FEAR TO TREAD
The issue of predicting dangerousness plagued psychotherapy long
before the Tarasoff opinions were handed down. Not only have
psychotherapists had difficulty predicting dangerousness, they have
had difficulty diagnosing mental illness in general.69 This means that
psychotherapists will miss dangerous behavior in some patients and
identify it falsely in others. This is the centerpiece of Justice Mosk's
dissenting opinion in Tarasoff H: he feared that shifting violence
prediction from the courts to the psychotherapists "takes us from the
world of reality into the wonderland of clairvoyance."7 °
The next logical question is whether psychotherapists overpredict or
underpredict violence, and, if so, what would be the impact of each
type of error?
66. STONE, supra note 4, at 183.
67. Rosenhan et al., supra note 58, at 1209.
68. Stone, supra note 4, at 359. Stone wrote that Tarasoff "not only reduces
the opportunity of the seriously mentally disturbed to obtain effective treatment,
but fails to serve the court's primary purpose of reducing the danger that such
patients pose to the public." Id.
69. Rosenhan et al., supra note 58, at 1185-1186.
70. Tarasoff 11, 551 P.2d 334,354 (Cal. 1976) (Mosk, J., dissenting in part).
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Even before Tarasoff it turns out that psychotherapists had a
tendency to overpredict violence in their patients'.7  Thus, there
doubtless exist a number of "false positive" patients who actually do
not pose great harm to others.72 According to a 1984 study reported in
the Wisconsin Law Review (hereinafter "Wisconsin Survey"), forty-
five percent of responding psychotherapists have issued Tarasoff
warnings when these warnings directly conflicted with the
psychotherapists' clinical judgment. 73 This suggests that the courts
have succeeded in substituting their judgment for the
psychotherapist's--a substitution that threatens the practice of
psychotherapy. An oft-quoted statistical anecdote instructs the reader
to assume that one person out of one thousand will kill. If a test with
an accuracy of ninety-five percent is devised, for every one hundred
thousand people tested, ninety-five out of one hundred killers would
be identified. But 4,995 innocent people out of the 99,900 innocents
would also be identified as killers.74 Even this might not appear to be
an obvious problem--at least ninety-five percent of the killers will be
able to be stopped--but this does not end the discussion.
Tarasoff I extended the therapist's duty to warn (established by
Tarasoff I) to a duty to protect.75  Since the Tarasoff court never
supplied substantive content to what "protection" entails,
psychotherapists and judges have interpreted this duty in a wide
variety of ways. One popular reading of the duty associates protecting76
third parties with committing dangerous patients to mental hospitals.
The link between commitment and duty to protect was not invented
post-Tarasoff. In a 1934 Yale Law Journal article, Harper and Kime
suggest that medical professionals, including psychotherapists, have a
duty to control the conduct of their patients, discussing commitment as
one way to accomplish this.77  The previous statistical anecdote
suggests that nearly five thousand innocents will be involuntarily
71. John G. Fleming & Bruce Maximov, The Patient or His Victim: The
Therapist's Dilemma, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1025, 1045 (1974).
72. D.L. Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 179 SCIENCE 250, 258
(1973).
73. Daniel J. Givelber et al., Tarasoff, Myth and Reality: An Empirical Study of
Private Law in Action, 1984 Wis. L. REV 443, 470 (1984).
74. STONE, supra note 28, at 167.
75. Tarasoff 11, 551 P.2d at 340.
76. STONE, supra note 28, at 183.
77. Fowler V. Harper & Posey M. Kime, The Duty to Control the Conduct of
Another, 43 YALE L.J. 886, 887, 897 (1932). Harper and Kime wrote that a "duty
to control" might exist where there is an "unreasonable risk" to a third party.
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committed because the psychotherapist, erring on the side of caution,
will overprotect third parties out of concern for his own Tarasoff
liability. Therefore, he will infringe on the rights of those five
thousand and potentially face legal action for violating patient
privilege. This puts the psychotherapist between a rock and a hard
place: he must choose between limiting liability and providing proper
treatment.
Several of the previous factors--willingness to seek therapy,
willingness to treat, and dangerousness--were examined largely
theoretically, primarily because there have not been any recent follow
up studies on the order of magnitude of those conducted within a
decade of Tarasoff. The resultant court cases, however, provide hard
data concerning whether (and if so, how) the duty to warn and protect
was narrowed or expanded.
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VII. TARASOFF'S LEGACY:"8 THE SHRINKING DUTY TO WARN AND
PROTECT
78. Tarasoff has had far reaching effects beyond the realm of psychotherapy,
but these applications are beyond the focus of this article.
For example, the ongoing HIV epidemic has generated controversy in determining
whether a physician has the duty to warn a third party who may be exposed to
HIV via the physician's infected patient. The first court to consider the Tarasoff
ruling in deciding such a case was the California Court of Appeals in the 1985 case
of Reisner v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 518 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995). In Reisner, twelve-year-old Jennifer Lawson received a blood transfusion
while undergoing surgery at the University of California Los Angeles Medical
Center in April of 1985. The day after the surgery, her physician, Dr. Eric
Fonklesrud discovered that the blood she received was tainted with HIV.
However, Dr. Fonklesrud chose not to inform Lawson or her parents.
About three years after the transfusion, Lawson started dating Daniel
Reisner. After three months, the relationship became sexually intimate, and, on
March 7, 1990, Lawson was diagnosed with AIDS. She immediately informed
Reisner and his family of her diagnosis and died a month later. Shortly after
Lawson's death, Reisner learned that he too tested positive for HIV. Reisner and
his family sued Dr. Fonklesrud and UCLA, claiming they had a duty to warn
"others [who were] likely to apprise [Daniel] of the danger" of contracting HIV.
Id. at 520. The defendants argued that this duty to warn did not apply in cases
where the third party was "unknown or unidentifiable." Id.
This court expanded the Tarasoff decisions when it found that the
defendant's liability was predicated on the foreseeability--not the identifiability--of
the victim. Holding that Lawson's likelihood of entering into an intimate
relationship at that time was foreseeable, the court granted the defendant's appeal
on the grounds that "[c]ivil liability for a negligent failure to warn under the
circumstances of this case may not hasten the day when AIDS can be cured or
prevented, but it may, in the meantime, protect one or more persons from
unnecessary exposure to this deadly virus." Id. at 522.
But the courts have also expressed opposite messages regarding the
physician's duty to warn in HIV cases. In 1995, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals in N.O.L. v. District of Columbia held that a physician has no duty to
warn a husband of his wife's HIV status. 674 A.2d 498 (D.C. 1995). On the
contrary, the court stated "[Tihe hospital staff owed a duty to appellant's wife to
refrain from disclosing that information to anyone." Id. at 499.
In 1996, the Maryland Special Court of Appeals continued this trend of
strengthening confidentiality. In Lemon v. Stewart, the Maryland Special Court of
Appeals ruled that physicians attending to Mr. Lemon, an acknowledged
intravenous drug addict, had no duty to disclose the results of Lemon's HIV test to
his family. 62 A.2d 1177 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996). The Court said that
physicians, hospitals, and laboratories have to warn only the patient--not his
family--of his HIV status. Id. at 1183.
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A. The Early 1980s: Refining the Notion of Identifiability
In 1980, the California Supreme Court got the chance to clarify what
Tarasoff requires of psychotherapists in the case of Thompson v.
79County of Alameda. James F., a troubled teen in Piedmont,California, and a ward of the county, regularly saw a therapist pursuant
to a court order. The therapist noted that James had "latent,
extremely dangerous and violent propensities regarding young
children and that sexual assaults upon young children and violence
connected therewith were a likely result of releasing [him] into the
community." ' During his therapy sessions, James did not threaten any
one child in particular; rather, he said he could direct his anger at
anyone in the neighborhood. Not having anyone in particular to warn,
the therapist warned no one. Within twenty-four hours of his
temporary release from county custody, James killed Clifford
Thompson's five-year-old son. Thompson argued that the county was
liable for failing to warn families in the neighborhood that such a
dangerous individual was about to be released. The California
Supreme Court, however, disagreed. The court concluded that when
James communicated his violent thoughts to his therapist he described
a "large amorphous public group of potential targets" rather than a
readily identifiable victim. Here, the court noted that even though the
potential victim need not have a name, he must still be describable in
terms more specific than simply some member of a large,
indeterminate group.8 '
Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.82 significantly broadened the
Tarasoff duty. In that case, Ulysses Cribbs, a patient of a
psychotherapist at a Veterans Affairs hospital, purchased a shotgun
from the Sears catalogue, entered a nightclub and opened fire into a
crowd. Cribbs killed Dennis Lipari and wounded his wife, Ruth Ann.
The court permitted the Lipari family to file suit against the hospital
For a thorough discussion of Tarasoff s application to HIV/AIDS cases, see
Christine E. Stenger, Taking Tarasoff Where No One Has Gone Before: Looking at
"Duty to Warn" Under the AIDS Crisis, 15 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 471 (1996),
and for a look at Tarasoff applied to genetically heritable diseases in general, see
Michelle R. King, Physician Duty to Warn a Patient's Offspring of Hereditary
Genetic Defects: Balancing the Patient's Right to Confidentiality Against the Family
Member's Right to Know- Can or Should Tarasoff Apply?, 4 QUINNIP1Ac HEALTH
L.J. 1 (2001).
79. Thompson v. County of Alameda, 614 P.2d 728 (Cal. 1980).
80. Id. at 730.
81. Id. at 738.
82. Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1980).
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despite the fact that Cribbs never conveyed to his psychotherapist a
desire to do harm. The District Court of Nebraska determined that the
jury should decide whether the therapist should have known the
patient's propensity for violence. Thus, the Tarasoff duty was
determined to require protection of all of society from danger caused
by a patient whose conduct is reasonably foreseeable to the therapist.83
In the 1983 case of Jablonski v. United States, 4 Phillip Jablonski was
brought to a hospital after attempting to rape his girlfriend's mother.
While the emergency room psychiatrist concluded that Jablonski was a
danger to others, he could not involuntarily commit Jablonski to a
mental institution under California law. Less than a week after his
release, Jablonski killed his girlfriend. The Ninth Circuit held that the
hospital failed to obtain necessary medical records and to warn the
potential victim. In addition to extending the psychotherapist's
Tarasoff duty, Jablonski comments on the formation of the
psychotherapist-patient relationship. The court's ruling implies that
the special covenant between psychotherapist and patient may in fact
arise from cursory meetings in an emergency room. Thus, the
Jablonski court expected the psychotherapist to predict the behavior of
an individual about whom the psychotherapist knew little more than
85he did about a random stranger.
The cases in this subsection represent just a few of the many early-
to mid-1980s cases that elaborated on the Tarasoff decisions in
determining psychotherapist liability. The full collection of these cases
is too large to treat with any depth here, and several authors have done
very thorough jobs of this task elsewhere.86
B. The Late 1980s and the 1990s: Limiting the Tarasoff Duty by What
the Victim Knew or Should Have Known
One salient way in which courts restricted the Tarasoff holdings was
to absolve psychotherapists of the duty to warn if the victim had or
87
should have had prior knowledge of the patient's dangerousness.
83. Ebrahim J. Kermani & Sanford L. Drob, Tarasoff Decision: A Decade
Later Dilemma Still Faces Psychotherapists, 41 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 271, 277
(1987).
84. Jablonski v. United States, 712 F.2d 391 (9thCir. 1983).
85. Kermani & Drob, supra note 83, at 280.
86. SLOVENKO, supra note 36, and SLOVENKO, supra note 50 present
comprehensive treatments of Tarasoff-influenced opinions throughout the 1980s
and 1990s. See also Peter F. Lake, Revisiting Tarasoff, 58 ALB. L. REV 97 (1995).
87. More general versions of this observation have been made before; see
Walcott et al., supra note 6. However, this trend of limiting based on victim's
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Courts using this approach reasoned that psychotherapists should notbe required to warn a third party when that third party was, or should
have been, aware of the danger.
The first clear example of this trend in the literature appears to bethe 1982 Iowa case In re Estate of Votteler.8 Lola Hansen was apsychiatric patient of Dr. Robert Votteler's who suffered from serious
mental illness which often manifested itself in the form of compulsive
violent behavior over a two-year period in the mid-1970s. Shefrequently threatened her husband, friends, and others who tried to
outbid her at furniture auctions. It was at one of these auctions where
she met Ramona Heltsley. True to form, Ms. Hansen threatened tokill Heltsley on several occasions, and also threatened Heltsley andMr. Hansen jointly more than once. Ms. Hansen was hospitalized
twice over the course of her particularly aggressive phase. Each timeDr. Votteler asked Mr. Hansen to shed more light on his wife'sbackground, and each time Mr. Hansen did not tell Dr. Votteler abouthis wife's violence. Perhaps Dr. Votteler should have been able tojudge Ms. Hansen's tendencies for himself, but nevertheless he issued
no warning to Helstley or to anyone else. 9
In early 1976 Ms. Hansen was hospitalized for a second time.90 InJuly of that year her husband left her and she began seeing Heltsley
socially. Three months later, Ms. Hansen drove her car over Helstleyin a local park and killed her. A suit was filed on Heltsley's behalf
against Dr. Votteler's estate (he had since died) relying chiefly onTarasoff. The trial court rejected the plaintiff's analogy to Tarasoff,
and the Iowa Supreme Court agreed. In its decision, the courtdistinguished the Tarasoff fact pattern on the basis that Tatiana
Tarasoff had no knowledge that Poddar posed any danger to her. The
court held that Tarasoff and some of its progeny "[support] a
knowledge--in psychotherapy cases in particular--seems stronger, perhaps, than
what Walcott et al. communicated by citing three such cases: Jacobs v. Taylor, 379S.E.2d 563 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989); Moye v. United States, 735 F. Supp. 179 (E.D.N.C.1990); and Boulanger v. Pol, 900 P.2d 823 (Kan. 1995). For one thing, the trend
seems to have started even earlier (1982) than the first case they consider. Also,
unlike the present paper, Walcott et al. considered Tarasoff s restriction generally-
-not just with respect to victim's knowledge--and did not focus their analysis purely
on psychotherapy cases.
88. In re Estate of Votteler, 327 N.W.2d 758 (Iowa 1982).
89. Id. at 761.
90. Id.
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conclusion that the duty should not be imposed when the foreseeable
victim knows of the danger."9'
92Next in this line of cases is Hinkelman v. Borgess Medical Center, a
1987 case in Michigan. Virginia Hinkelman's live-in boyfriend, Daniel
Travis, started to become possessive and suspicious of her in the spring
of 1978. That June he went to counseling sessions at a nonprofit
mental health center. His conditioned worsened, and he was referred
to psychiatrist Dr. Charles Overbey for further evaluation. At the
same time, Hinkelman told Travis to leave her parents' home where
they both had been staying. Dr. Overbey diagnosed Travis with a
personality disorder, treatable with medication and continued
counseling, but he did not commit Travis. In October of that same
year, Travis showed up unannounced at Hinkelman's parents' home
and refused to leave until Hinkelman would speak with him.
Hinkelman complied on the condition that they would go together to
Borgess Medical Center, where Travis would admit himself for
treatment, which he agreed to do.93
At Borgess, Travis experienced second thoughts about
hospitalization, but Hinkelman begged him to stay.94 Travis then
threatened her and, behind a closed conference room door, tried to
choke her. Hinkelman did not press charges until Travis appeared at
her home again later in October. Police issued an arrest warrant two
days later, but Travis had readmitted himself to Borgess. His
admission was approved by Dr. Overbey. Though he was evaluated by
a social worker to be unstable and violent, Travis was allowed to leave
the hospital later that night. Less than two weeks later, Travis broke
into Hinkelman's home and raped her. He was later apprehended.
While in jail, a psychiatrist (not Dr. Overbey) examined Travis and
found him to be a definite danger to Hinkelman, despite the fact that
he had made no direct threats during the evaluation. One week later,
after he was released on bail, Travis kidnapped Hinkelman, and fatally
shot her and then himself. Hinkelman's family argued that Dr.
Overbey and Borgess Medical Center failed to warn Hinkelman of the
danger Travis posed, but the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the
lower court's ruling that discharged Dr. Overbey's and Borgess's
psychotherapy personnel's duty to warn because "regardless of
whether the hospital knew or should have known of the danger to
Hinkelman, the victim herself was aware of the danger. Since
91. Id. at 762.
92. Hinkelman v. Borgess Med. Ctr., 403 N.W.2d 547 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).
93. Id. at 548.
94. Id.
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Hinkelman already knew of the danger, the duty to warn did not
arise.'
This principle was reinforced by the 1989 Georgia case Jacobs v.
Taylor.96 Since 1978, Ronald Murray had been in and out of mental
hospitals for threatening to kill his former wife, Marjorie. The record
showed that Ms. Murray either received the threats directly or had
learned of them through indirect means. During his initial stay at the
hospital, Mr. Murray was under the care of Dr. Jacobs, a therapist. In
1980, fresh from his latest release, Mr. Murray was arrested for
"terroristic threats" he had made to his wife during an earlier
confrontation.97 He was deemed unfit to be jailed and was sent to a
secure psychiatric facility where he was again placed under Dr.
Jacobs's care. Eventually, Dr. Jacobs judged Mr. Murray fit to enter
the general prison population. Shortly thereafter, he was ruled
competent to stand trial. Mr. Murray was acquitted in April 1981, and,
upon his release, murdered his former wife and two others. Ms.
Murray's family argued that Dr. Jacobs breached his duty to warn Ms.
Murray, but the court held that Ms. Murray's knowledge of her former
husband's threats constituted all the warning to which she was legally
entitled. That is, "[T]he doctors were not legally required to warn
Marjorie Murray of the precise danger to which she was already fully
aware.98
Less than a month after the Jacobs decision, the court in Wagshall v.
Wagshall held that a victim's knowledge eliminated a psychotherapist's
Tarasoff duty to warn. 99 Joshua Wagshall and his wife Marlene saw a
therapist for several months in 1985 because of marital problems.
During their counseling, they signed an agreement with the counselor
to have their firearms stored in a place neither could access. This was
done so in part because Mr. Wagshall knew firsthand that his wife was
prone to violent behavior. In July 1985, after the marriage counseling
ended, Ms. Wagshall used one of the family-owned firearms to shoot
and injure her husband. Mr. Wagshall argued that the counselor
should have warned him about his wife's potential for violence, but the
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court said Mr.
Wagshall's prior knowledge eliminated the counselor's duty to warn
him.10
95. Id. at 551.
96. Jacobs v. Taylor, 379 S.E.2d 563 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
97. Id. at 564.
98. Id. at 568.
99. Wagshall v. Wagshall, 538 N.Y.S.2d 597 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).
100. Id. at 598-99.
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The next case on the record that eliminated Tarasoff warnings when
the victim had knowledge of the patient's violent tendencies was the
1990 case of Moye v. United States from the Eastern District of North
Carolina. '° ' Milton Moye joined the U.S. Navy in June of 1981, but
developed paranoia and alcohol dependency and had to be medically
discharged just two years later. At that point, Moye checked in
voluntarily to a Veterans Affairs treatment facility where he
underwent three separate periods of treatment, each lasting a month
on average. Between the first and second treatment periods, Moye
attended outpatient therapy and participated in family conferences
with his parents, who were made aware of, and who apparently
independently knew of, his potential for violent behavior. Before he
left his third treatment session, Moye was told that he suffered from a
personality disorder and that the medication he was prescribed was not
helping. Shortly after leaving the Veterans Affairs facility, he entered
a private treatment center, but was asked to leave after just one week
at the center because he did not comply with its rules and policies.
Staff at the private facility asked Moye's parents if they wanted to
medicate him, but they refused. Moye moved into a YMCA near his
parents' home in Raleigh and almost immediately thereafter shot and
killed his parents. Relatives of the Moyes sued the Veterans Affairs
center for failing to warn Moye's parents of the danger their son posed,
but the appellate court did not entertain this claim since North
Carolina does not have a Tarasoff statute. Moreover, the court ruled
that even if such a duty did exist, the hospital would not be held liable
since "the foreseeable victim knew of the danger associated with the
patient .... ,103
In the 1993 case Leonard v. Latrobe Area Hospital,'°4 the
Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed a motion for summary judgment
for a psychologist who failed to warn a victim who knew that her
husband was violent. James Gault was admitted to the Latrobe
Hospital Psychiatric Unit after overdosing on aspirin in September of
1983. A psychiatrist observed him for eight days and allowed him to
return home. Less than three months later, he shot and killed his wife.
The record states that Gault's wife was familiar with his previous
violent episodes. The lower court granted the hospital's motion for
summary judgment, finding it "a curious lapse in logic on plaintiffs'
101. Moye v. United States, 735 F. Supp. 179 (E.D.N.C. 1990).
102. Id. at 180. The court noted that Moye's father did not "inform the police
or hospital staff of his son's violent propensities or bizarre behavior." Id.
103. Id. at 181.
104. Leonard v. Latrobe Area Hosp., 625 A.2d 1228 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
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part to claim that [the psychiatrist] should have warned them of
information they already had, and with which they were familiar."'
05
Knowledge negated duty once again in the 1995 Kansas case
Boulanger v. Pol.'°6 Ron Hill had endured brain damage as a child and
suffered from physical and mental abnormalities thereafter. In
particular, in the late 1980s, he believed his uncle Boulanger was the
Devil. Following an incident in late 1989 where he had accosted
Boulanger, Hill voluntarily admitted himself for treatment. However,
less than six months later Hill was discharged and sent home, where he
assaulted his father and attempted to stab himself. He was then sent to
another treatment facility where he was supervised by Dr. Albert Pol.
Hill exhibited normal, nonviolent behavior and was discharged into his
parents' care with Dr. Pol's permission after five months in the facility.
Ten days later, Boulanger visited the Hill's home, where Hill shot
Boulanger, killing him. Boulanger's family claimed that Dr. Pol had a
duty to warn Boulanger upon Hill's release, but the Kansas Supreme
Court disagreed, stating that "the uncontroverted facts establish
[Boulanger] was fully apprised of the danger posed by Ron. The duty
to warn does not arise when the victim already knows of the danger.',
0 7
This reasoning was also followed in Dunk v. United Statesl°8 in 1996.
Robert Dunk was a corporal in the U.S. Marine Corps and physically
abused his wife in November 1985 while he was stationed in Quantico,
Virginia. He transferred to Camp Lejeune in North Carolina that
December and took his wife and two sons with him. The domestic
abuse continued. Ms. Dunk attempted to leave her husband and
obtained a protective order against him. Cpl. Dunk's commanding
officer had him removed from the family home and placed in the
barracks with another marine, but shortly thereafter Cpl. Dunk left the
barracks, kidnapped his wife, and threatened to kill her. Ms. Dunk
filed a complaint, and Cpl. Dunk was eventually arrested and forced to
undergo a psychological evaluation. The hospital pronounced him fit
to return to full duty, and Cpl. Dunk was released. On July 17, 1990,
Ms. Dunk dropped her complaint. That night, Cpl. Dunk purchased a
pistol from a fellow marine, entered the family home, and shot his
wife, killing her, and then killing himself in front of his two children.
When a suit was filed on behalf of Ms. Dunk, the Fourth Circuit stated
that no Tarasoff duty existed in North Carolina, and, even if one did,
105. Id. at 1231.
106. Boulanger v. Pol, 900 P.2d 823 (Kan. 1995).
107. Id. at 835. The court cited Wagshall in its opinion.
108. Dunk v. United States, No. 95-1149, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 1171 (4th Cir.
Jan. 30, 1996).
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"there is no duty to warn a potential victim of another's violent
behavior when the victim is already aware of the danger."' 9 The court
reasoned that Ms. Dunk must have been aware of her husband's
violent tendencies since she attempted to leave him and later filed a
complaint against him.1
The same year saw another example of this trend in New York's
Kolt v. United States." Vietnam veteran Thomas Kolt was honorably
discharged from the military in 1971. He began seeing various
psychiatrists and psychotherapists at a Veterans Affairs facility in 1978
and continued to make occasional visits until December 1991.
Throughout this period, Kolt displayed instances of depressive and
suicidal behavior. During one incident in September of 1991, Kolt hit
and kicked his wife. Evaluations performed during his treatment
periods concluded that Kolt presented only a minimal danger to others
and a minimal to severe danger to himself. On January 1, 1992, Kolt
shot and killed his wife and himself. His wife's family argued that
psychotherapy personnel at the Veterans Affairs facility had a duty to
warn her, even though Kolt's danger to others was not described as
severe. Apart from addressing the issue concerning Kolt's
psychotherapist's evaluation, the Western District of New York ruled
that no duty to warn exists when, as in this case, the victim is fully
aware of the patient's potential for violence. 2
This limitation on psychotherapist liability when the victim knows
her attacker's potential for violence might itself be subject to several
restrictions which warrant further investigation. First, does this
limitation on Tarasoff liability observe a cooling-off period? That is,
does it matter whether the victim learns of her attacker's potential for
violence one year before versus one month before harm occurs?
Second, does this limitation on Tarasoff liability depend on whether
the victim has knowledge of her attacker's general violent propensities
versus knowledge of her attacker's tendency to engage in the precise
type of violent behavior that causes harm to the victim?
109. Id. at *7.
110. Id.
111. Kolt v. United States, No. 94-CV-0283E(H), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15786
(W.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 1996)
112. Id. at 10-11.
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C. Bringing Tarasoff Up to Date: A Survey of Recent Cases
The 1997 Texas case Limon v. Gonzaba"3 discussed a therapist's
duty to warn based on second-hand information that a patient may be
violent absent any direct observation. In 1992, Lorenzo Limon was
taken to the Gonzaba clinic by his daughter and spoke with a therapist
for close to a half-hour. He told the therapist he was depressed about
his former marriage and problems at work, but he did not report
feeling suicidal or homicidal. However, Limon's daughter told the
therapist that her father was "a danger to himself and others.' '14 The
therapist diagnosed Limon with mild depression and referred him to
another treatment facility. Two days later, Limon went to his ex-wife's
home and shot her. As a result, she became a paraplegic. The court
found that despite the combination of the daughter's warning of
general violence and Limon's specific comments about his former
wife's depressing phone calls, the attack was not foreseeable. The
therapist was not held liable.'
The 1999 Wisconsin case State v. Agacki16 is interesting to consider
in light of Thompson and Lipari. In May of 1996, Curtis Agacki told
his therapist that he set a motorcycle on fire after a fight in a bar and
that there might have been witnesses. Agacki said he was not afraid
because "[i]f they try anything, I will pull my piece out and blow their.
. heads off. I will kill them. I don't care what happens to me... I am
not afraid of it, dying.""' 7 The therapist asked Agacki to meet him
face-to-face in a nearby tavern, separate from the bar where the fight
occurred. Before leaving for the meeting, the therapist called
Milwaukee police. He requested assistance in the likely (in his
opinion) event that Agacki might have to be involuntarily hospitalized.
When the therapist finally met Agacki, Agacki communicated to the
therapist both verbally and nonverbally that he was armed. The
therapist left the tavern briefly and summoned a nearby police officer.
He told the officer Agacki was inside and had a gun. The officer
arrested Agacki.
At trial, Agacki claimed his statements about being armed and
killing any bar fight witnesses were privileged.1 8 The WisconsinAppeals Court disagreed and held that his statements were not
113. Limon v. Gonzaba, 940 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. App. 1997).
114. Id. at 237.
115. Id. at 241.
116. State v. Agacki, 595 N.W.2d 31 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).
117. Id. at 33.
118. Id. at 33--34.
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privileged since the therapist had "reasonable cause to believe his
patient was dangerous."1 9 The court allowed the therapist to protect
the tavern patrons and the public generally even though Agacki
specifically threatened the witnesses of a fight at another
establishment . 2 The holding in this case represents one example of a
sharp turn in the Tarasoff legacy: allowing a psychotherapist to protect
a larger group (the public) based upon an inference drawn from
threats made to a smaller group (witnesses to the fight).
The 2000 New Jersey case Runyon v. Smith 2' presents an interesting
example of a therapist being punished for having done too much rather
than too little. In January of 1995, Diane Runyon obtained a
temporary restraining order prohibiting her husband, Guy, from seeing
their children. Because he believed it was Mrs. Runyon who posed a
threat to the children, Mr. Runyon immediately contested the order.
During the hearing, Mr. Runyon called Dr. Maureen Smith, who had
treated Ms. Runyon over a five-year period, as an expert witness. Dr.
Smith testified that Ms. Runyon had been physically and verbally
abusive with one of the children and that she was involved in a cult.
She concluded that it was in the children's best interest that they be
placed with Mr. Runyon. The family court judge agreed and granted
him temporary custody, but Ms. Runyon filed a complaint against Dr.
Smith for breaching psychologist-patient privilege. Dr. Smith then
filed a motion for summary judgment, which the court granted.
However, the appellate court reversed in favor of Ms. Runyon in large
part because Dr. Smith failed to secure a court order granting her
permission to disclose information drawn from her therapy sessions
with Ms. Runyon. The New Jersey Supreme Court stated, without
qualification, that
[i]f a psychologist fails to raise the patient's privilege and
discloses confidential information without a court determination
that disclosure is required, the psychologist has breached the
duty owed to the patient and the patient has a cause of action
against the psychologist for the unauthorized disclosure of
information obtained in the course of treatment.122
The court did not clarify whether a court order is needed for any
type of disclosure of confidential information or only for such
disclosure in legal proceedings. The Runyan case simplifies the job of
a New Jersey psychotherapist, although the result is perhaps more
119. Id. at 38.
120. Id. at 33, 38.
121. Runyon v. Smith, 749 A.2d 852 (N.J. 2000).
122. Id. at 852-53.
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frustrating: obtain the court's permission prior to disclosure or do
nothing. Only three subsequent cases--all in New Jersey--have
appeared to rely on Runyon, and all three seem to have preserved
nearly inviolate the need for a court order to disclose confidential
123contents of psychotherapy sessions. It will be interesting to see
whether jurisdictions begin to require psychotherapists to obtain the
permission of a court before they intervene on the potential victim's
behalf in a Tarasoff-type situation.
United States v. Hayes,2 4 a 2000 case before the Sixth Circuit,
demystifies Runyon in the sense that it sharply distinguishes between a
psychotherapist's disclosure to a third party in dire need of protection
and disclosure in a court of law where the third party's safety has
presumably stabilized. Roy Hayes had worked for the United States
Postal Service for nearly his entire adult life. In 1997, he became
depressed and sought treatment at a Veterans Affairs facility in
Tennessee, where he informed his treating psychiatrist of his strong
desire to kill his supervisor at work. No warning was given to the
supervisor. Hayes was released shortly thereafter and told to contact a
different treatment center. Just four days later, he returned to the
same facility as an inpatient and reiterated his murderous desires. He
was treated again, released, and this time given a psychotropic drug
prescription. In March of 1998, nearly one year later, Hayes visited
another Tennessee mental health facility, this one in Johnson City. He
spoke with a social worker at the facility about his desire to kill his
supervisor and described in meticulous detail how he was going pull it
off. The social worker, however, thought Hayes was not a serious
threat and released him the next night on Hayes's promise to return in
two weeks for more therapy sessions. Hayes began to feel unpleasant
side effects from his medication, and the psychiatrist he saw at the first
facility ordered him to stop taking it. This, combined with some
unfortunate family events, caused Hayes to become increasingly
depressed. Hayes returned to the Johnson City facility for more
therapy with the social worker. Again, Hayes outlined a very detailed
plan as to how he would murder his supervisor, and again he was
released. The next day, the social worker warned the supervisor, and
123. The cases Correia v. Sherry, 760 A.2d 1156 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
2000), Cavallaro v. Jamco Prop. Mgmt., 760 A.2d 353 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2000), and Crescenzo v. Crane, 796 A.2d 283 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002)
reinforce the notion of obtaining judicial permission to disclose confidential
therapeutic information.
124. United States v. Hayes, 227 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 2000).
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the supervisor arranged to file a criminal complaint against Hayes for• • 1 2 1
threatening to murder a federal official.
The lower court suppressed the threats as privileged, and the Sixth
Circuit agreed in the sense that those statements relayed by the social
worker were not admissible in any prosecution of Hayes.126 However,
the court noted that the social worker did act properly when he issued
the Tarasoff warning to the postal supervisor. 12 This case, perhaps
more than any of Tarasoffs other progeny, sharply distinguished the
public protection aspect of Tarasoff warnings from the legal
ramifications behind them by considering third party safety entirely
independent from subsequent disclosure in a court of law.
A few other recent cases deserve at least a brief mention. In the
2001 case Swan v. United States,'2' the District Court for the Northern
District of California held that Tarasoff does not compel a
psychotherapist to disclose confidential information to prevent harm
from a third party. In this case, an inmate told a prison psychologist
that he feared attacks from other men in his cellblock. The
psychologist neither divulged this information to the prison board nor
asked that the fearful prisoner be transferred or protected in any way.
The prisoner was later attacked and sustained injuries which required
the surgical removal of his left eye. He unsuccessfully sued the
government, which controlled the prison in which he was incarcerated,
for failure to protect. The court ruled that the prison psychologist did
not need to divulge the content of her sessions with the prisoner, even
though it might have been the surest way to preserve 
his safety.129
Mason v. IHS Treatment Center of Desoto, Texas130 in 2001 offered
another chance for a court to close the gap between what constitutes a
readily identifiable set of third parties and what is only, as the131
Thompson court stated, an "amorphous" group. Mason, Thomas,
and Cleveland were patients in a mental health facility. Mason and
125. Id. at 580-81.
126. Id. at 586.
127. Id.
128. Swan v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (N.D. Cal. 2001), affd 32 Fed.
Appx. 315 (2002).
129. Id. at 1183.
130. Mason v. IHS Treatment Ctr. of Desoto Tex., No. 05-98-00832-CV, 2001
Tex. App. LEXIS 5494 (Tex. App. Aug. 15, 2001). This case was reversed in part
as to defendants other than the therapist considered in this paper in 143 S.W.3d
794 (Tex. 2004).
131. Thompson v. County of Alameda 614 P.2d 728, 738 (Cal. 1980).
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Thomas were released, and shortly thereafter, Cleveland, who
remained in the hospital, asked his doctor for permission to go for a
ride with Thomas and "another former patient" of the facility. 32
Permission was denied, but Cleveland later left the facility on his own
accord. Less than a month later, he was killed in a car accident while
riding with Mason and Thomas, who was driving. Among the litigation
which emerged from this event was the suit against Thomas's therapist
brought by Mason's family for failing to protect Mason from the risk
created by Thomas's discharge. The Masons claimed the therapist
should have identified Mason as a "former patient" and warned him
that Thomas might have been planning a dangerous activity. 133  A
Texas appeals court disagreed and said that the group of "former
patient[s]" of the treatment facility was not sufficiently specific to
induce a duty to warn.13 4 This stands in stark contrast to cases such as
Lipari and Agacki where those courts expected therapists to protect
the public at large.
Finally, the North Carolina Court of Appeals dealt with Tarasoff
very simply in the 2002 case of Gregory v. Kilbride:35 It reiterated that
"North Carolina does not recognize a psychiatrist's duty to warn third
persons."'
36
D. Continuing the Knowledge As Negator Trend
The tendency for courts to negate the duty to warn a third party who
has knowledge of the patient-assailant's violent tendencies has
persisted since the late 1980s.'37 The 2000 New Mexico case Weitz v.
Lovelace Health Systems13 presents one of the first such examples.
Eddie Gutierrez was a U.S. Air Force Staff Sergeant stationed at
Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque, New Mexico. He and his
wife Arlene were having marital problems and, in December of 1991,
went to see several psychotherapists employed by Lovelace Health
132. Mason, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 5494, at *2.
133. Id. at *1.
134. Id.
135. Gregory v. Kilbride, 565 S.E.2d 685 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002).
136. Id. at 692.
137. While its published facts are too sparse to merit a lengthy narrative review,
Von Ohlen v. Piskacek might present another example of this trend. 717 N.Y.S.2d
221 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000). Here, the court held that two doctors--perhaps
psychotherapists, perhaps not--"had no duty to warn the plaintiff of her husband's
vicious tendencies. The plaintiff was well aware of those tendencies, because her
husband had stabbed her on a previous occasion." Id. at 222.
138. Weitz v. Lovelace Health Sys., 214 F.3d 1175 (10th Cir. 2000).
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Systems, a company providing mental health facilities to Air Force
personnel. Both of the Gutierrezes also had individual sessions with
these therapists. During one of Ms. Gutierrez's individual sessions, she
expressed fear of her husband's violent potential.
3 9
On December 29th, she went to her husband's home to discuss their
marriage.1 4 0 When she told her husband she was leaving, he drew a
handgun which she was able to wrestle away. Ms. Gutierrez left safely
and reported the incident to her husband's commanding officer, who
made an appointment for Mr. Gutierrez to undergo a mental health
evaluation. Mr. Gutierrez met with a therapist to whom he confided
that he was unsure whether he would be able to handle his emotions if
he and his wife divorced. After his second appointment the next day,
the therapist pronounced Mr. Gutierrez "improved" and encouraged
him to seek outside counseling.141 Mr. Gutierrez never obtained this
additional help, but in the interim surrendered his weapons to an Air
Force sergeant at the request of his commanding officer. Two weeks
later Mr. Gutierrez asked for the weapons back on the excuse that he
just wanted to take some target practice on tin cans. The sergeant
returned the guns. One month later, Mr. Gutierrez shot and killed his
wife, daughter, and finally himself after his wife came to his house to
pick up their daughter.
142
Suit was filed on behalf of Ms. Gutierrez and her daughter against
the Lovelace psychotherapy personnel who saw Mr. Gutierrez but did
not warn Ms. Gutierrez of the danger he posed.
143  Rather than
extensively discussing Tarasoff (New Mexico had not decided whether
to adopt such a duty) the Tenth Circuit reasoned that New Mexico
would not impose a duty to warn where the victim was already
"subjectively aware" of the patient's violent behavior.'"
The Tarasoff duty was refined once again in 2003 in Howard v.
Parsons' Child & Family Center.45 In this case, the Parsons' Child and
Family Center placed a violent special needs child with a foster parent
in the Germantown Central School District in the fall of 1994.
139. Id. at 1177.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Weitz, 214 F.3d at 1182.
144. Id. The court deduced this from previous New Mexico legal proceedings
involving products liability, stating the "common-sense proposition that a duty to
warn does not arise where the danger is known." Id.
145. Howard v. Parsons' Child & Family Ctr., 761 N.Y.S.2d 381 (N.Y. App. Div.
2003).
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Educational personnel for the school district first assigned the child to
the second grade. This proved unsuccessful and the child was
reassigned to a first grade class taught by Ms. Alayne Howard.
Between the two placements, the Parsons' Center personnel directly
observed the child's violent behavior but did not inform Ms. Howard
or the school district generally. The child's private full-time aide,
however, did say that he observed numerous incidents of the child's
aggressive behavior, all of which he reported to school officials(though not necessarily Ms. Howard). Indeed, on February 9, 1995,
the aide wrote a letter to a school district official expressing his
concern that the child might turn violent in certain situations. Less
than a month later, the child grabbed Ms. Howard's hair in class one
day and slammed her head against a metal doorstop. 146
Ms. Howard survived the attack and sued the Parsons' Center,
claiming that its psychotherapy personnel had a duty to warn the
school district of the violent tendencies they observed between the
child's first and second academic placements and that they failed to do147
so. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court's dismissal, noting that the child's behavior
was brought to the school district's attention by its own psychologist
(apparently during an earlier examination) and by the letter from the
child's full-time aide. According to the court, the school district had
knowledge and did not need to be warned further. 48
VIII. CURRENT PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC ATTITUDES
The preceding cases represent the most current examples of judicial
attitudes towards Tarasoff and its progeny. Psychotherapeutic
attitudes towards Tarasoff are more difficult to come by, but some
recent commentaries do display a rather enlightened and optimistic
view of Tarasoffs impact.
While noting that clinicians do not enjoy having regulations forced
upon them and that they do not relish having to keep legal--in addition
to medical--issues in mind, psychiatrist Dr. Damon Muir Walcott and
his colleagues report that some therapists see Tarasoff as having had a
largely positive impact, particularly when it comes time to issue
warnings. 49 Communicating candidly with the patient about the need
146. Id. at 382.
147. Id. at 384.
148. Id.
149. Walcott et al., supra note 6, at 340.
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for and purpose of the duty to warn is helpful for the clinician. Dr.
Walcott reports that this discussion process might actually strengthen
the sense of trust between the psychotherapist and the patient.
Moreover, several medical commentators have suggested that warning
a third party in the presence of the patient might be the best route to
take. This way the patient is not surprised and a sense of trust can be
enhanced in the therapy session.5
In fact, one group of psychotherapists argued that having the patient
himself issue the Tarasoff warning is the best option."' Under this
scenario, not only is the patient not taken by surprise, but having the
patient give the warning is perhaps the most direct way to put him on
notice of any potential legal consequences."' This method lets the
psychotherapist escape ethical dilemmas by having someone outside
the profession--the patient--break the privilege of confidential
conversations. After all, the privilege is for the patient's protection.
Thus, having the patient breach it is perhaps one of the least
controversial ways to go about this type of disclosure.
A recent question-and-answer column in the American Medical
News's "Ethics Forum" also sheds some light on this area.
5 In
outlining some general principles for physicians to consider when
contemplating breaching patient confidence, psychiatrist Dr. Paul
Browde uses Tarasoff as a starting point for thinking critically about
when disclosure is appropriate. Rather than laying out a blanket
philosophy, Dr. Browde argues in favor of case-by-case analysis of
when it is appropriate to breach confidentiality, and advances a six-
point test for evaluating the issue. Dr. Browde formulates his six-step
inquiry for physicians in general, but on the whole it is applicable to
psychotherapists as well.
1 4
First, the physician should ask where the secret that might be
disclosed is located. For example, is it within an individual or among
members of a family?'55 Second, what is the content of the secret? It
could be something that is innocent, such as a secret a teenager might
keep from his parents, or it could be dangerous like Poddar's
150. Id.
151. See Wulsin et al., Unexpected Clinical Benefits of the Tarasoff Decision:
The Therapeutic Alliance and the Duty to Warn, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 601
(1983).
152. Id. at 602.
153. Paul Browde, Discretion Often the Better Part of Valor, AM. MED. NEWS
(Am. Med. Ass'n, Chicago, Ill.) Aug. 2, 2004, at 10.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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statements of his murderous intent. Third, what are the consequences
of the secret itself? For example, Dr. Browde notes that the secret of
testing positive for HIV meant near-certain death twenty years ago but
might be less dramatic and sensational today. Next, what are the
consequences of revealing this secret? This point operates like a cost-
benefit analysis similar to the fourth Wigmore test for privilege which
measures the good versus the harm of keeping a given item
confidential.'5 6 Dr. Browde puts the penultimate question as "Which
biases influence the physician's decision?', 5 7 Finally, if the physician
chooses to disclose the secret, how should she proceed? This last point
is a nontrivial, practical issue, and Dr. Walcott's report 58 about the
therapeutic benefits of warning with the patient present might very
well provide the beginnings of an answer to this important question.
CONCLUSION
In some sense, the California Supreme Court intervened in a field
that needed no legal intervention because the Pacific Survey found
that therapists would disseminate warnings to third parties based upon
personal and professional ethics rather than legal mandate. 159
Psychotherapists have reported that Tarasoffs goal was achieved long
before the case was ever adjudicated, yet there still lacks a large-scale
patient study asking questions analogous to those posed to therapists
by the Pacific, Stanford, and Wisconsin surveys.
Other dichotomies have yet to be empirically resolved. When
Tarasoff was initially decided there came a great deal of judicial
baggage which weighed heavily upon the psychotherapeutic
profession. However, the visible trend of limiting the Tarasoff duty
when the victim had knowledge of his assailant's violent tendencies has
shifted the courts' role from hector to helper. Early post-Tarasoff
studies, surveying psychotherapists, reported that patients are less
likely than before the Tarasoff decisions to reveal their true feelings in
therapy.' 60 Nevertheless, future research involving psychotherapists
and patients might show that this problem is becoming less severe.
156. WIGMORE, supra note 47.
157. Browde, supra note 153.
158. Walcott et al., supra note 6.
159. Rosenhan et al., supra note 58, at 1219. A reported 97.5% of responding
psychotherapists said they would warn a potential victim regardless of Tarasoff
liability.
160. Id. at 1191.
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And while earlier surveys concluded that psychotherapists have
become so anxiety-ridden since Tarasoff when dealing with the
question of violence that they let the issue dominate the therapy
session, disregard the issue, or avoid potentially violent patients
altogether,161 some of the most recent medical commentaries note
Tarasoff s potential value as a clinical tool and springboard for
thinking critically about medical privacy issues. 162
Tarasoff has been both nexus and naysayer for American
psychotherapy, but it appears that it has the potential to make the field
of psychotherapy better through the holding's steady and reasoned
limitation in the courts and emergence as a decision with tangible
clinical benefits. Obviously, more patient data are needed, and other
ethical considerations, such as potential damage done to innocent
patients whose confidences are violated, cannot be ignored. On the
balance, however, there seems to be enough of an upside to feel
cautiously optimistic about Tarasoff s ability to positively impact
psychotherapy.
161. See Wise, supra note 57; Rosenhan et al., supra note 58.
162. See Walcott et al., supra note 6; Browde, supra note 153.
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